Book Review: Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism
by Adrian Kuzminski (Lexington
This is an interesting and important book which offers an
interpretation of a philosophical way of approaching belief that I think is an
excellent way of being and that could do much for our world threatened by the
madness of fanatical dogmatists. This Pyrrhonist view is most exemplified in
the works of the Ancient Greek philosophers Pyrrho of Elis and Sextus
Empiricus, and in other forms by the Buddhist philosophers Nagarjuna and
Chandrakirti as well as the early 20th century philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein. I think the book’s title (or rather subtitle) is a bit misleading
as a case is not really made for Pyrrho or any of the later Pyrrhonist sceptics
actually reworking Buddhist philosophy though that is a remote possibility as
Pyrrho was said to have visited India with Alexander the Great and developed
his philosophy from ideas of Indian sages. Nagarjuna came along several centuries
after Pyrrho and it seems more plausible (though not very) that he was
influenced by the Greeks who had lived and mingled in Bactria in
Indo-Greek syncretistic mostly Buddhist communities since the time of
Alexander. This book is one of comparative philosophy. It is unique that it is
a comparison of nondogmatic philosophies.
Pyrrhonists are distinguished by the idea of suspending
judgment about what is nonevident. Furthermore, this freedom from belief (about
what is nonevident) was thought by them to extend to a kind of contemplative
freedom without the anxiety surrounding beliefs. This they called ataraxia. Belief involves uncertainty
and uncertainty can spur anxiety. Focus on presence and immediate experience
without clinging to beliefs can mitigate such anxiety. I think such a practice
can be quite relevant today and quite therapeutic as well. One might call it –
‘keeping an open mind’ – which is perhaps more difficult to do than one might
think as we have preconceived notions about many things.
The author makes a long and quite detailed case to point out
that Pyrrhonism is different than Scepticism, particularly the later Scepticism
of the Academics, which is more a “nihilistic negative dogmatism.” Pyrrhonism
and Academic Scepticism have been equated throughout history and he makes a
very good case that this is a misunderstanding that has been perpetuated
through time. The Academic Sceptics assert that there are no true beliefs while
the Pyrrhonist makes no assertions, but merely suspends belief. This seems to
be a very clear difference. Academic Sceptics draw a conclusion while
Pyrrhonists do not. Nothing nonevident is affirmed or denied and judgment is
suspended. Pyrrhonism is not a view or theory, but rather a practice of
non-attachment to things non-evident. It is therapeutic rather than dogmatic. Sextus
Empiricus referred to it as a skill, or ability, rather than a view, or dogma. Only
appearances are evident – sensations and thoughts that make for obvious
acknowledgement and upon which we can easily agree. These ideas, according to Kuzminski,
bear “…a striking similarity to some Eastern nondogmatic soteriological
traditions, particularly Madhyamaka Buddhism.”
The Pyrrhonists called themeselves skeptics but “only in the
original Greek sense of the word, skeptikos
– a seeker, one who inquires or examines, considers, deliberates, etc.” Unlike
the later Sceptics they did not question all assertions and when they did so
the goal was to discern which assertions concerned nonevident matters and which
were based on self-evident experience. Thus the goal of their inquiry was not
to endorse or refute statements but to sort out what is (subtly) evident from
is nonevident.
Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines
of Scepticism “distinguishes Pyrrhonism very clearly from negative as well
as positive dogmatism.” To him a “sceptic” is merely an inquirer and not one
associated with a particular view. Pyrro of Elis was around in the 4th
century B.C. By the middle of the 3rd century B.C. the term
“sceptic” began to be associated with a view of negative dogmatism by those in
Plato’s Academy. Sextus Empiricus lived in the 2nd century C.E. but
still exemplifies the Pyrrhonist ideal rather than the negative dogmatism of
the Academic Sceptics. Most scholars have apparently regarded these stances as
two branches of one school but the author makes an excellent case that this is
a big misnomer. Sextus Empiricus divided philosophy into those who have
discovered the truth – Dogmatists (ie. Stoics, Aristotelians, Epicureans, etc),
those who have discovered that truth is not discoverable – the Academics
(negative dogmatists), and those who are still investigating – Sceptics
(Pyrrhonists). Here is clear differentiation of Academics (now called Sceptics)
and Sceptics (here called Pyrrhonists). This is the confusion that has been
perpetuated. Oddly, as Kuzminski notes, this confusion, perpetuated from an
early time, has relegated Pyrrhonism to a fringe way of thought that is only
now rediscoverable in its original form. The early Academic Sceptic –
Arcesilaus (a late contemporary of Pyrrho) was said by both Sextus Empiricus
and Diogenes of Laertius in his Lives of
the Eminent Philosophers, to be a fake Pyrrhonist who was really a
Dogmatist. The Academic Sceptics also tended to abandon the goal of ataraxia –
the tranquility that comes from being free of attachment to beliefs. Kuzminski
also notes that it is a great irony that Pyrrhonism has come to be associated
with a form of Dogmatism since the whole basis of it is non-dogmatism. More
recent philosophers such as Hume and Nietzsche have also perpetuated the error
of equating Pyrrhonism with Dogmatism. Nietzsche had some insights into the
matter regarding the connectoion of Pyrrhonism to Buddhism but considered both
to be nihilistic. In Buddhist philosophy, nihilism is well pondered but
considered to be a non-desirable and extreme view. Nietzsche celebrated the
Will as the antidote against the “emptiness” or meaninglessness of nihilism.
Another part of the confusion is the question whether thoughts and sensations
are beliefs. We can have beliefs about thoughts or sensations but if those
beliefs are nonevident – if there are no logical and agreed upon means of
drawing a conclusion about them then according to Pyrrhonists, beliefs about
them should be suspended. The work is in sorting the evident from the
nonevident. It is the negative dogmatist Academic Sceptics that refute all
beliefs while the Pyrrhonist does not specifically accept or reject beliefs but
merely suspends judgment.
Pyrrho of Elis was said to be influenced by Indian sages in
developing his philosophy and it is reasonably likely that those sages were
Buddhists. Although Madhyamaka philosophy was not yet present the idea of
suspending judgement about beliefs may well have been derived from these sages.
Although the author does not mention it there is a sutra attributed to Buddha –
I believe from the Pali Canon – that refers specifically to the dangers of
getting attached to opinions, any opinions. This is similar to the Pyrrhonist
philosophical practice. Pyrrho lived a simple life after returning from India . He was
visited in Elis
by seekers such as his disciples Timon, Hecataeus, and Nausiphanes. Timon was
known for his humor. After these students of Pyrrho the tradition fades into
obscurity for a while but then is revived centuries later near the time of
Sextus Empiricus. However, Diogenes of Laertius does offer a lineage of
Pyrrhonists (that does not include the Academic Sceptics) in his Lives when speaking of the life of
Timon.
Pyrrhonists advocated detachment from what is nonevident
rather than what is evident. This is an important distinction that may distance
it just a little from Buddhism, although much of the detachment recommended in
Buddhism is indeed regarding our beliefs about things, or more specifically our
mistaken beliefs about things.
Apparently, there are few modern people who consider
themselves to be Pyrrhonists. One is the Norwegian ecological philosopher Arne
Naess, who wrote a book on Scepticism. He is also apparently well aware of the
distinction between Pyrrhonism and Academic scepticsim. Naess states the
Pyrrhonian “view” thusly:
“Reality is in darkness, but not necessarily in darkness; perhaps it can be brought to light; at
least he does not know that it cannot.”
The author thinks that Naess does not go far enough in his
suspension of belief – that he considers, as did many of the ancient Greek
philosophers, conceptuality to be the vehicle of truth and so that notion
itself becomes a belief. This is a bit paradoxical but I think the idea is that
the existence of “truth” itself is really a belief in the existence of truth.
It is a belief that if we could discover the correct conceptualizations, then
we would apprehend truth and thus make evident what is nonevident.
Sextus Empiricus best explained the Pyrrhonist way of
thinking in his texts where he detailed the sorting of the evident from the
nonevident. Appearances are those things that are apparent, that can be agreed
upon by convention. Beliefs beyond this are often sources of conflict and
misunderstanding. Myths and abstract theories may sometimes require a
“temporary suspension of disbelief” in order to fully experience them. Such
nonevident projections may have value that can point out and enhance what is
evident but the sheer belief in them is belief in the nonevident. There is an
account by the 2nd century Christian Eusebius that paraphrases the
method of Pyrrho as given by his disciple Timon:
“… we… should be without opinions and without inclinations
and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is
not or both is and is not or neither is or is not”
Interestingly, the four conditions noted above (is, is not,
both, and neither) are a logical argument put forth by both Indians and Greeks
and perhaps other ancient thinkers and are a special feature of Mahayana
logical philosophy where they are sometimes called the “four extremes.” It is
also called the tetralemma, or quadralemma, in the Greek tradition
where it was known to Aristotle (before Alexander’s travels) where he
complained that it was annoying to argue against – yet Pyrrhonists may not have
considered its use as a practice rather than as a logical argument.
Kuzminski notes that Pyrrhonism and Buddhism are both nondogmatic
soteriological practices. Pyrrhonism may be the only such practice in the
Western traditions, he notes. Other Eastern nondogmatic soteriological
practices may include some forms of Taoism, Jainism, and Hindusim. Kuzminski
gives a survey of possible idea diffusion among Greeks and Indians. A
thoroughly comprehensive and utterly fascinating study of this sort is Thomas McEvilley’s
The Shape of Ancient Thought which
traces and compares the development of many ideas all across the ancient world.
In both Buddhism and Pyrrhonism great effort is put forth to avoid adoption of
specific views and as argued this is a practice more than a view since it is
the avoidance of views – even the avoidance of a view-avoiding view. Kuzminski
thinks that Pyrrho developed the idea of ataraxia, tranquility through freedom
from beliefs based on his contacts with Indian sages. He cites other authors
such as Flintoff who notes several Indian ideas that may involve freedom from
belief such as: ahimsa, advaita, nirvana,
ananda, samadhi, bodhi, chit, moksha, sat.
Flintoff also pointed out that there existed a skeptical
tradition in India
once led by an obscure contemporary of Buddha called Sanjaya Belatthiputta.
Diogenes of Laertius notes that Pyrrho met with gymnosophists (naked philosophers).
They may have been Buddhists, Jains, or these Sanjayan skeptics. One scholar,
Hiralal Jain, noted that Sanjaya was considered an Ajnavada, or an Agnostic. Diogenes also noted that Pyrrho adopted a
wandering lifestyle after his return to Greece , likely influenced by the
Indian ascetics. Other ancient Westerners who adopted such customs included
Diogenes the Cynic and Apollonius of Tyana.
Kuzminski compares other ancient Western practices to
Eastern meditative traditions but finds few key similarities until Hellenistic
times when diffusion likely brought more ideas from the East that were
integrated into the Western traditions. He mentions the yogic and meditative
practices of the Greek Hesychasts who practiced immovability of the body and stopping
of the breath. Later there are the meditative spiritual practices of theurgists
and Neoplatonists like Plotinus that quite resemble Eastern meditation.
McEvilley’s book noted the similarities between Pyrrhonism
and the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti but discounted any
direct Indian influences on Pyrrho, even though the legends say otherwise. He
also noted that Democritus as well as Pyrrho’s teacher Anaxarchus had developed
an idea of tranquility as a goal of philosophy so perhaps his ideas were at
least partially developed before he went to India . But Flintoff notes that
harnessing the specific technique of suspension of judgment as a means to
liberation was not in evidence among the Greeks before Pyrrho.
Next, Kuzminski covers the roots of Madhyamaka Buddhism. He
mentions the Sutta Nipata from the
Pali canon as a source. Key texts are Nagarjuna’s The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way and Chandrakirti’s The Entry Into the Middle Way. The key
texts for Pyrrhonism are Diogenes of Laertius’s Life of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism and Against
the Logicians. Comparing Madhyamaka Buddhism and Pyrrhonian scepticism,
Kuzminski favorably compares the following ideas of these two systems: method,
belief, suspension of judgment, tranquility, and appearances. Appearances here
include both thoughts and sensations. The comparisons he gives are detailed and
most favorable. Madhyamaka philosophy also deals with the logic of refutation,
particularly in the later Prasangika
version where refutation is the key practice. It is thus a very skeptical
tradition of inquiry – but has also been wrongly associated with nihilism and
pessimism. There is similarity to the Greek dialectical tradition as well. The
Prasangika method (rather than view) is one of reducing ideas to absurdity
through logical and conceptual analysis. It is the utilization of conceptuality
with a goal of non-conceptual wisdom. Even meditative techniques have the
feature of releasing the bonds of belief by the method of noting changes in
one’s consciousness without reaction, without engaging with what appears, and
without accepting or rejecting – just noting. It is a similar idea, although it
is not thought that meditation played a part in Pyrrhonism. Madhyamaka philosophy
teaches non-attachment to all dogmas – neither asserting or denying. The author
suggests a possible parallel of the Buddhist sunyata (emptiness) with the Pyrrhonist aphasia (non-assertion). The Buddhist practice is to recognize
emptiness (of self and other-than-self) while Sextus Empiricus gives aphasia,
or non-assertion, as not affirming or negating, ie. suspension of judgment. One
cannot even assert non-assertion. Similarly, Madhyamaka advises not to get
attached to Emptiness or Non-emptiness. Both philosophies seek not to establish
truth but the clear away error. Thus wisdom is seen not specifically as truth
but as absence of falsehood. One may suggest that it is the same – just
negatively expressed, but the possibility remains open whether knowledge can be
refined further as more becomes known or evident. It is a sort of stalemate and
as the author notes, “the fruit of stalemate is tranquility.” Both Diogenes and
Sextus Empiricus noted that ataraxia follows suspension of judgment “like its
shadow,” perhaps an unexpected discovery. Nagarjuna noted that “the root of
cyclic existence is action. Therefore the wise one does not act.” More
specifically this may refer to acting on the basis of beliefs arising from
self-centered motives (karmic action). Regarding appearance both Pyrrhonism and
Buddhism note that they are mutually dependent, or relative to one another.
Appearances are a “middle way’ between existing and not existing rather than
one or the other, both, or neither. Nagarjuna
also said that “Everything is real and not real, both real and not real,
neither real nor not real.” So we see there is a positive tetralemma as well as
a negative tetralemma and in the Buddhist tradition where what is seen as true
(temporarily) often depends from what level of realization one inquires. Such
statements may appear contradictory but the function I think is to point out
that “all of the above” is not different than “none of the above” – or that
reality cannot be ultimately known through conceptualizing as it is a “dead
end” leading to the precipice of paradox, a word which can mean “beyond
opinions.” The notions in the Sutta Nipata of avoiding arguments and being free
from clinging to beliefs and opinions can be seen as precursor to the open view
of the Madhyamaka.
The author goes into great detail with these comparisons of
Pyrrhonism and Buddhism as well as of Pyrrhonian skepticism vs. Academic
skepticism. Much of the next section is devoted to clarifying the distinction
between the evident and the nonevident and this can get rather tedious. The
nature of appearances is discussed. In Pyrrhonism this includes evidence from
the senses, including thought to a certain extent. Pyrrhonists may have held a
different notion of appearances than their peers among the Stoics, Epicureans,
and Aristotelians, who tended to give abstractions such as ideals a real
existence. The Greeks distinguished noomenon
(mental formulations) from phainomenon
(that which appears to the senses). It is the latter that is emphasized as
evident by Sextus. Form without content and content without form are both not
apparent, and so not evident to the Pyrrhonist. The details become muddled when
one considers different types of appearance such as the skandas (aggregates) in Buddhism and the different types of
evidence in Pyrrhonism. Here the nature of subject and object is examined.
Private and public appearances are compared. Appearances may at times be
unreliable, ie. optical illusions. Indeed, the untrustworthiness of the senses
led the early physicists like Thales to promote reason above sensory knowledge
– a move which Sextus regarded as dogmatic. Even though Sextus defends most
appearances as evident he also rails against the orthodoxy of materialistic
science as a dogma that assumes things that are not evident like “intelligent
design.” Certainly the same could be said of today’s dogma of materialistic
science – that the assumptions made about what is going on behind the scenes of
observed phenomena are not as evident as science makes them out to be. There is
also the idea of the evidently non-evident. Is consciousness evident to
consciousness? Does subject exist separately from object? As an object? Sextus
says no as the Buddhists say the self does not exist independently. Is this an
assertion? Is it in any way different than asserting the independent existence
of a self? Indeed, the Yogacara, or Cittamatra (mind-only) school of Buddhism
Sextus gives four classes of objects or facts (pragmata) as nonevident: things
manifest, things absolutely nonevident, things naturally nonevident, and things
temporarily nonevident. Things manifest are our direct sensations and thoughts.
Things absolutely nonevident are things and ideas which are never likely to be
known such as the exact number of stars in the sky or sand grains in a desert.
While there may be exact answers to such questions we will likely never know
them. Things naturally nonevident are in a similar class but they may be
unknowable for different reasons. Sextus gives the nature of the soul as an
example. While we could in theory count the stars in the sky if we had the
ability to see them all we cannot determine the exact nature of the soul due to
lack of clarity. It is a rather shaky and subtle distinction – they are almost
the same. In the former case we can see how to make them evident (counting) but
in the latter we are unsure. Things temporarily nonevident are things that
would become evident to us if we experienced them with our senses such as a
place we have never seen. There is discussion of “signs,” both recollective
signs and indicative signs. Seeing smoke and assuming fire is an example of a
recollective sign (as both are routinely observed together). Indicative signs
require more assumption. An example Sextus gives is the statement that bodily
movements are a function of the movements of the soul. That may or may not be
true but it is clearly nonevident. Thus recollective signs are accepted as
evident though temporarily nonevident but indicative signs are considered nonevident.
The lines may sometimes be murky. Kuzminski goes through the “stock arguments”
of the Pyrrhonists to indicate the evident vs. the nonevident. He makes this
statement regarding Science:
“Science is about elucidating anticipating what is evident,
including what can be made evident through signs; it is the explicit
development of our system of recollective signs to represent correlations among
appearances not otherwise representable to us. To show that something believed
to be evident cannot (at least yet) be made evident, that it appears in fact to
be nonevident, is to show that it is not science.”
These days the findings of quantum theory especially but
also relativity, psychic phenomena, and the aberrations of consciousness can
challenge what we take as evident and nonevident. Even scientific, atheistic,
ideological, and secular ideas can involve taking what is nonevident as
evident, though by definition they should not. Kuzminski also notes that much
of our science is only partially evident, based on statistical probabilities
and conjecture.
Buddhism approaches signification in terms of nama-rupa, name and form. These are
links on the chain of dependent origination. We make objects “real” by defining
them (giving them form) and naming them. Thus we tend to see the world (and the
mind) as composed of distinct objects and ideas. Significations that are a
matter of belief such as assertions of the existence of a soul or an afterlife
scenario can be the cause of much anxiety and disagreement. Beliefs should be
seen as beliefs rather than as facts and Kuzminski suggests that this is a goal
of Buddhist meditative practice.
Kuzminski concedes that as a religious tradition that
Buddhism has become fairly ritualized and dogmatic yet in principle it is not.
Some such as Stephen Batchelor in his Buddhism
Without Beliefs have pointed out that ideas like the Four Noble Truths were
meant to inspire the means to free oneself from suffering rather than expounded
as facts. Buddha described himself more along the lines of a doctor, or healer,
than as a savior. Batchelor invokes agnosticism as a Western analogue to the
approach of Buddha. Thomas Huxley, in the 19th century coined the term and
defined it as a third alternative between the extremes of positive and negative
dogmatism. For an agnostic the alternative “I don’t know” is always available.
Korean Zen Master Seung Sahn always would say to keep Don’t Know Mind so an
agnostic approach can be seen there. Batchelor noted that Buddha apparently
harbored some beliefs about what is nonevident such as a belief in
reincarnation – although according to tradition such an idea was quite evident
to him as an Awakened One. Batchelor suggests that we suspend judgment on such
matters but many Buddhist teachers suggest that it is fine to have such
beliefs. Perhaps some of us merely lean toward such beliefs without actually
embracing them.
The author goes through the work of Richard Popkin who wrote
a thorough history of scepticism. Even though he acknowledged the distinction
between Pyrrhonian skepticism and Academic skepticism he strands the ideas
together in his influential work, according to Kuzminski. For this reason he
sees Popkin’s work as a modern perpetuation of the same long held
misunderstandings.
Augustine put a new spin on Pyrrhonism by falsely assuming
that Sextus’s arguments were seeking to refute reason as a way to understanding
nonevident reality. Augustine sought to replace knowledge of the nonevident
through reason with knowledge of the nonevident through divine revelation or
faith. This view is called “fideism” and Pyrrhonists would likely laugh at such
nonsense and appropriation of their arguments for his dogmatic approach for
faith basically is belief. Of course, one may also argue that Buddha’s
enlightenment was also some sort of revelatory or mystical knowledge from an
external source though Buddha himself clearly stated that it was not. Kuzminski
thinks that Augustine was key in perpetuating the misunderstanding of the two
sceptic schools into modern times. Augustine’s goal was to discredit the
philosophy tied to pagan traditions and replace it with a philosophy tied to
divine revelation from the Christian God. Thus the texts of Sextus Empiricus
came to be used (or rather misused) in the Middle Ages to support this fideist
view of divine revelation as a true means of discerning what is nonevident. Thus
they had reason to depict Pyrrhonists such as Sextus as negative dogmatists.
The author gives 18th century Irish Bishop Thomas
Berkley as one who broke through and propounded Pyrrhonism in a basically
correct manner in his Principles of Human
Knowledge although he was no Pyrrhonist himself, being a bishop in the
Anglican Church. Although he is usually given in the British empiricist trio of
Locke-Berkley-Hume, the author notes that Locke was a positive dogmatist and
Hume an Academic sceptic. Berkley
denied the distinction between appearances and reality and did not favor an
external reality beyond appearances. Incidentally, that is an inseparability
noted in the Buddhist Mahasiddha tradition of India as well. Berkley did, however, alter his understanding
of Pyrrhonism to incorporate his own belief in God and his argument became very
similar to the fideism of Augustine, though with more actual Pyrrhonist
features. The author thinks he made some good arguments in favor of Pyrrhonism.
The modern philosopher most Pyrrhonian in outlook seems to
be the early 20th century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He does
not seem to have been familiar with the works of any Pyrrhonists but to have
developed his ideas independently. He did not publish much and feared his ideas
were not well understood even though he had a following during his lifetime. He
focused on mathematics and language. The author sees his approach as that of a
full Pyrrhonist. This statement from his Tractatus
is exemplary:
“What can be said at all can be said clearly and what we
cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.” Wittgenstein also pointed out
the “doubt presupposes certainty.” We can only doubt something against a
comparative background of certainty. We only inquire about things which we have
some doubt. Wittgenstein also pointed out the complete doubt of the negative
dogmatist Academic skeptics is incoherent. His “picture theory” of signs and the
objects they indicate is similar to that of Sextus. His friend and commentator
Paul Engelmann stated his theory thusly:
“The relationship between the world (appearances) and
language (representation, depiction) is logic, or logical form, and this is precisely
what, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be represented.”
He also pointed out that describing what we experience is
not the same as experiencing and so language is merely representational rather
than real. Communicating experience is thus far not doable and what we
experience is thus ineffable, or at least incommunicable.
Interestingly, Engelmann described Wittgenstein’s philosophy
as a practical method of living, free of ideologies. He also used phrases like
“wordless faith,” “a new spiritual attitude,” and “a universal new way of life”
to describe it.
A dogmatist would be one who comes to conclusions about
nonevident things while a Pyrrhonist forms no conclusions, at least until
things become evident. It is as simple as that, yet we are beset by beliefs in
the nonevident as a cultural habit. We see possible connections between things
and predict how things will happen and we often see scant evidence as proof
that things are as we predicted. In other words, it is not easy to be impartial
to beliefs. Fears about the unknown are based at least partially on our
exposure to beliefs about the unknown. As humans we seem to like to judge
things so suspending judgment is perhaps not part of our habit – but it well
should be. I vote that we be less judgmental!
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